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Shinjinee Chattopadhyay
This thesis examines the role of economic markets and agents in promoting entrepreneur-
ship, and their impact on innovation. The first chapter focuses on small business creation
within the context of the United States economy, while the second chapter looks at returns
to high-technology entrepreneurship internationally.
Chapter 1 examines the impact of economic downturns on entrepreneurship in the United
States by illustrating the direct link between the labor market and self-employment sector.
When conditions in the labor market deteriorate for certain groups of individuals they are more
likely to become entrepreneurs. This chapter shows that while African-American (henceforth
Black) entrepreneurship rates have hovered around one-third that of the Caucasian (hence-
forth White) rate across all industries since 1910, Blacks are significantly more likely than
Whites to become entrepreneurs, thereby narrowing the racial entrepreneurship gap. This
phenomenon is accompanied by a widening of the racial wage gap - a 1 percent increase in
state level unemployment causes Black wages to fall by 5 percent while nominal White wages
remain unchanged. This is not a result of a compositional change in the labor force or indus-
try specific shocks and the estimates are robust to an IV approach. This chapter next shows
that discrimination reduces the demand for Black labor, resulting in the decrease of Black
wages. Black wages fall more sharply with higher unemployment in states with higher racial
prejudice compared to that in states with lower racial prejudice. As Black business income
does not show corresponding cyclicality these empirical facts suggest that falling wages alter
the payoffs from wage employment relative to self-employment, incentivizing Blacks to start
businesses. Black businesses started in recessions do not differ from their White counterparts
in income generated, incorporation rates or duration of survival. Moreover, it is the higher-
ability Blacks who become business owners in recessions, suggesting that these ventures are
voluntary and not the result of job termination.
These findings show that Blacks do not differ from Whites in entrepreneurial ability, but
face high barriers to entry into entrepreneurship and only cross these barriers when incentives
change.
Chapter 2 examines the role played by economic agents and ownership structures in
creating incentives for high-technology entrepreneurship. The goal of high-technology en-
trepreneurship is to go public through initial public offers (IPO). Going public eases access to
finance and rewards entrepreneurs for innovation. This chapter examines the links between
the corporate ownership structures of an economy, focusing in particular on business groups,
and the degree of average underpricing associated with IPOs. This approach allows for an
exploratory look at the effects of market competition, information asymmetry, power and
conflicts of interest on IPO pricing. Using a cross-country analysis based on two independent
data sets, the chapter shows that the amount of money left on the table for investors decreases
with the degree of concentration of ownership within the economy. The greater the degree of
separation between control and equity ownership, the smaller the average IPO underpricing.
These findings are viewed as supporting evidence for IPO pricing theories based on share
allocation, social control and power.
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Schumpeter’s theory of creative destruction (Schumpeter 1942) posits that innovative en-
trepreneurship sustains economic growth: the process of destruction of assets, capital and
personal wealth is cyclical and is accompanied by disruptive innovation which generates
growth. Often destruction and creation do not go hand in hand, but one follows the other.
The literature on entrepreneurship has only recently begun to examine the relation between
entrepreneurship and business cycles; this paper contributes to this emerging area.
Very recently (Fairlie 2013a) examined a panel data set from 1996 to 2009 and found
that both unemployment and the entrepreneurship rate reached a peak during the years of
2008-2009, coinciding with the period known as the Great Recession. He found that en-
trepreneurship rates track unemployment, both moving in the same cyclical fashion. Indi-
viduals are more likely to become entrepreneurs when unemployment rates are high, making
1I am grateful to my committee members Raymond Fisman, Daniel Wolfenzon, Olav Sorenson, Morten
Sorensen and Marina Halac for their thoughtful suggestions and advice. I thank Heitor Almeida, Jeffrey
Brown, Robert Fairlie, Jonah Rockoff, Supreet Kaur, Suresh Naidu, Ramana Nanda and Daniel Paravisini
for their helpful comments and suggestions. I also thank seminar participants at Columbia Business School,
London Business School and the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign for their comments.
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2entrepreneurship counter-cyclical.
Who are these individuals that become business owners during downturns, and why do
they turn to entrepreneurship at these times? We cannot attribute this to decreasing wages,
since since nominal wages have been found to be rigid during downturns in the United States.
An alternate view is that unfavorable employment conditions result in individuals seeking out
self-employment as an alternative to wage employment. If high job-termination rates and the
difficulty of finding suitable employment are the primary determinants of entrepreneurship
during recessions then we expect these entrepreneurs to be of lower-than average ability and
these businesses to be of lower-than average quality.
Moreover since most entrepreneurs in the United States are likely to be White or Asian,
it would be reasonable to expect the increase in entrepreneurship to be driven by White or
Asian individuals. This expectation would be further supported by the existence of the racial
entrepreneurship gap, which refers to the difference in the entrepreneurship rates between
Whites and Blacks. Although past literature on entrepreneurship and business cycles has
not looked at the response of individual ethnic groups to economic shocks, the overall Black
entrepreneurship rate in the US has consistently hovered around one-third that of the White
or Asian rates since 1910. This is not due to Black entrepreneurship being concentrated in
industries that have lower self-employment rates in general 2 (Fairlie & Meyer 2000). Given
that Blacks are much less likely than Whites to be entrepreneurs in equilibrium a reasonable
view would be to expect this pattern to persist during downturns.
In this paper I use the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) to follow a panel of
1000 individual households beginning in 1968 to 2003 to examine how individual employment
choices respond to economic shocks. I find, contrary to my expectations, that Blacks are
more likely to become entrepreneurs relative to Whites during periods of high unemployment.
Blacks are 18 percent more likely than Whites to become a business owner when local un-
employment increases by 1 percentage point (pp). Thus the entrepreneurship gap narrows
during economic downturns and widens during booms. I also find, surprisingly, that Blacks
who transition into entrepreneurship during economic downturns are high-ability Blacks and
2Black entrepreneurship rates are also lowest among all minorities.
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these businesses are of the same quality as businesses started during booms.
Why would some higher-ability Blacks prefer to start new businesses during recessions? I
posit that the answer is to be found in the labor market dynamics during downturns. I find
that the increase in the likelihood of Black entrepreneurship is accompanied by the widening
of the racial wage gap. When local unemployment increases by 1 percentage point (pp), White
wages remain rigid while nominal Black wages decrease by 5 pp. This decrease is not due to
a compositional change in the labor force, or occupation or industry specific shocks. Business
income of Blacks however, does not show any cyclicality. These findings suggest that when
unemployment increases, the decrease in nominal Black wages and acyclicality of business
income alter the payoffs from wage employment relative to self-employment, thereby creating
incentives for high-ability Black individuals to become business owners.
These findings then pose a new question: why do Black wages decrease while White wages
remain rigid? I argue that discrimination contributes to the widening of the wage gap during
high unemployment periods. I find that Black wages decrease by 9 pp with a 1 pp increase
in unemployment in a state characterized by high discrimination3, while wages of Blacks in
low discrimination states4 remain rigid. I find, analogously that business ownership among
Blacks in high discrimination states increases by 5 percent over the mean rate with a 1 pp
increase in unemployment compared to low discrimination states. Based on these findings I
argue the following. When unemployment increases Black wages decrease relative to White,
this effect being more pronounced in states with higher discrimination. Since business income
does not show cyclicality, payoff from starting a business in a recession can exceed wages and
this creates incentives for high-ability Blacks to become entrepreneurs. This effect is stronger
in states with higher levels of discrimination. This indicates that discrimination contributes
to the decrease in Black wages, and indirectly to the narrowing of the entrepreneurship gap
during periods of high unemployment.
This paper begins with a simple conceptual framework to illustrate how a decrease in
Black wages, or increase in business income can lead to higher self-employment. An individual
3Highly discriminatory states are those whose discrimination index value fall within the upper tercile of the
range
4Those in the bottom tercile of discrimination index
4chooses between a certain wage from labor, or uncertain payoff from self-employment (which
is interchangeably used with entrepreneurship in this paper). There exists a racial wage
differential, with Black wages being lower than White wages. When unemployment increases
Black individuals are more likely than Whites to become self-employed. I show that under
these assumptions an increase in unemployment can push Blacks to become self-employed
under any or both of the two conditions: a) business income of Blacks increases or b) average
Black wages decrease relative to White wages. Empirically I find that business income of
Blacks remain unchanged, but wages decrease.
I foresee that this paper has three novel empirical contributions to the literature: (a)
establishing the narrowing of the entrepreneurship gap during periods of high unemployment,
(b) establishing non-rigidity of Black wages during the same period leading to a widening of
the wage gap, and (c) showing that discrimination can explain changes in the wage gap.
The first contribution is to empirically establish that there are transient changes in the
entrepreneurship gap. Although past literature (for example (Evans & Jovanovic 1989),
(Evans & Leighton 1989), (Hurst & Lusardi 2004), (Meyer 1990), (Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian &
Rosen 1992) and (Borjas & Bronars 1989)) has examined potential causes of the entrepreneur-
ship gap5, transient changes in the gap and their implications have not been documented
extensively. It is only very recently that (Fairlie 2013b) in a forthcoming paper found higher
unemployment rates to increase entrepreneurship rates of individuals in the United States.
While my paper is consistent with this finding, I disaggregate entrepreneurship rates by race
and find that it is actually higher Black entrepreneurship that drives this result.
My next contribution is to establish that Black and White wages respond differently to
increases in local unemployment rates, leading to an increase in the wage gap. Past literature
((Corcoran & Duncan 1979), (Reimers 1983), (Blau & Beller 1991) among many others) has
5Past literature has studied the causes of the entrepreneurship gap but has not documented the transient
changes in the gap. (Evans & Jovanovic 1989), (Evans & Leighton 1989) were the earliest to cite liquidity
constraints as being a reason for the entrepreneurship gap, but the most recent literature do not find conclusive
evidence on this. (Meyer 1990) and (Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian & Rosen 1992) found that wealth or positive
liquidity shocks such as inheritances are significant but very small determinants in becoming an entrepreneur.
(Hurst & Lusardi 2004) looked exhaustively at the deciles of income and found that only the top 3 percent
of wealthy households drives the correlation between wealth and probability to become a business owner.
(Borjas & Bronars 1989) put forward a theoretical model where consumer discrimination was the source of the
entrepreneurship gap but this has not been supported by evidence since.
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established the existence of the wage gap: the median Black wage in the United States is
74 percent of the White wage6. Nominal wage rigidity has also been well-documented in
the literature: while wages increase following positive economic shocks, they do not fall after
a negative shock ((Tobin 1972); (Greenwald & Stiglitz 1987); (Blanchard 1993); (Clarida,
Gali & Gertler 1999); (Akerlof & Yellen 1990); (Gali 2002) and most recently (Kaur 2012)).
Past literature, however has not explored how Black and White wages respond separately
to economic shocks7. In other words, whether the wage gap is cyclical has been largely
unexplored. I show that the White-Black wage gap is countercyclical: White wages are
nominally rigid, as expected from past literature, but Black wages are not and decrease with
increasing unemployment. The White-Black wage gap therefore widens during a bust and
narrows during a boom. This decrease coincides with narrowing of the entrepreneurship gap,
suggesting that self-employment decisions of Blacks are influenced by wage dynamics.
The last empirical contribution of my paper is to explore the cause of the procyclicality of
Black wages or counter-cyclicality of the wage gap. I suggest that the cause is to be found in
the cause of the wage gap itself: discrimination. Since 1950 economists have been trying to
explain why Blacks earn less than Whites of same productivity. Authors have attributed the
unexplained portion of the wage gap to discrimination against Black workers. Becker’s (Becker
1957) seminal theoretical work on taste-based discrimination established an entire new area
of study8. Subsequent theoretical papers that followed, such as (Arrow 1971), (Arrow 1998)
6The wage differential exists when Blacks and Whites are matched across a set of observable characteristics
such as age, job market experience, education, gender, and occupation and persists across professions and
industries, with the only exception being engineering (Lee & Spriggs 2007)
7To my knowledge, (Lee & Spriggs 2007) is the only paper that examines cyclicality of the wage gap. They
find that the White-Black wage gap is countercyclical, with the gap increasing during recessions and decreasing
during booms. They study the Current Population Survey data from 1989 and 2002 and use unemployment as a
measure of economic conditions or business cycles. They argue that since the 1999 and 2001 recessions produced
”jobless recoveries” NBER designated recessions do not accurately represent local economic conditions. They
find that the White-Black wage gap increases during periods of economic contraction and decrease during
expansion and they attribute the reason to discrimination against Blacks. Their paper however does not refute
that the pro-cyclicality is due to a change in the composition of the workforce or occupation specific movements.
I address these issues in my paper.
8Becker focused on taste-based discrimination and described a model where prejudice causes an employer
to view a minority worker as having lower marginal productivity of labor. Minority workers therefore accept
lower wages than Whites for equivalent productivity. The market then sorts minority workers to the least
prejudiced employers while the White workers are hired by the more prejudiced employers. This creates
incentives for segregation as it is Pareto improving for both minority and White workers to be employed in
their own businesses
6and (Phelps 1972) modeled employers being subject to more statistical discrimination where
discrimination arises from asymmetric information about employee type or skill rather than
taste-based preference9. Later authors such as (Corcoran & Duncan 1979), (Reimers 1983),
(Smith & Welch. 1986), (Blau & Beller 1991), (Oaxaca 1973), (Oaxaca & Ransom 1994),
(Darity & Mason 1998) and (Fryer, Pager & Spenkuchm 2011) conducted best attempts to
account for observed characteristics and found that they only accounted for 50 percent of the
wage gap with the other half being accounted for by discrimination10.
I hypothesize that discrimination causes Black wages to fall after a negative shock while
White wages continue to remain rigid and this in turn affects the entrepreneurship gap.
These results follow the work of ((Charles & Guryan 2007)) who show that the wage gap is
larger in states with higher prejudice. My specification, however, being at the individual-
level, allows greater precision and lower omitted variable bias as I am able to account for
cross-sectional unobserved individual correlates. Moreover, I examine the size of the wage
and entrepreneurship gaps during business cycles, while their work focuses on equilibrium
conditions.
I follow the methodology used by (Charles & Guryan 2007) in creating an index for racial
prejudice in each state and each year. States with a higher value of the index are considered
to be more discriminatory. I find that the White-Black wage gap increases with the level
9Authors have found empirical support for statistical discrimination in different context, such as financial
lending. (Ravina 2008) looks at access to finance for Blacks relative to Whites and finds that Black borrowers
pay between 139 and 146 basis points more than similar White borrowers, but when ethnic similarity of lender
and borrower is taken into account the difference disappears. This suggests that Blacks pay more because there
are proportionally more Black borrowers than lenders. This lends more credence to the theory of statistical
discrimination and not based on taste-based discrimination.
10The limitation of the empirical approach of controlling for observables is that we can only draw a causal
inference when unobserved determinants of wages are not systematically correlated to race. (Reimers 1983)
estimates that discrimination accounts for 60 percent of the wage gap between White and Black men. (Fairlie
& Kletzer 2003) look at job displacement and re-employment rates and find that Blacks have 30 percent higher
job displacement and re-employment rates for black workers. (Lang & Manove 2006) demonstrated that racial
disparities in wages narrow dramatically and even reverse when conditioning only on age and the scores of the
Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) but when education is added to the list of controls the gap begins to
re-emerge. The most recent papers such as (Fryer, Pager & Spenkuchm 2011) have continued to find evidence
of discrimination with the latter finding that it can explain one-third of the wage gap. (Charles & Guryan 2007)
use the General Social Surveys data to establish a measure for the extent of prejudice present across states.
They find that the White-Black wage gap varies positively with the level of prejudice of the ”marginal” person
in the state but is unaffected by that of the most prejudiced persons of the state. This is in keeping with the
predictions of Becker taste-based discrimination model. They also find that the gap varies negatively with the
fraction of Black population present in the state.
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of discrimination predominant in that state and state-year level of unemployment. In other
words, Blacks living in states with higher levels of prejudice are likely to see their wages
fall at a higher rate than those living in states with lower levels of prejudice when state
unemployment increases. Analogously in the self-employment market, I find that Blacks in
high discrimination states also start more businesses in poor economic times, compared to
those living in low discrimination states. Interestingly, I also find instead that Blacks living
in higher discrimination states are more likely to drop out of the labor force entirely.
There are three main empirical challenges I have faced in this paper. The first challenge
lies in establishing changes in the entrepreneurship gap relates to reverse causality and omit-
ted variable bias. Higher self-employment rates may have an affect on local unemployment
rates. Moreover, a third exogenous factor such as external opportunity may affect both self-
employment and unemployment rates. I use the Bartik instrument (Bartik 1991) to instrument
for unemployment to mitigate these concerns and find that my results hold with significance.
A second concern relating to changes in the entrepreneurship gap is that Blacks who have
higher unemployment rates than Whites in general may be mis-reporting their employment
status to a greater extent than Whites. To address this concern I conduct the following ro-
bustness checks: I narrow the sample to those who report themselves as ’business owners’,
not merely those who declare themselves to be ’self-employed’. I do this as ’business owner’ is
more narrowly defined than ’self-employed’ and people are less likely to mis-report themselves
as business owners. In addition I examine the ability of individuals starting businesses in re-
cessions, and the quality of these businesses started. I find that as an economy goes from a
boom to a bust it is the higher ability individuals who go into business ownership, compared
to those who remain in the labor market. Since higher ability individuals are among the less
likely to be unemployed (which I verify using a second data set), it is unlikely that they are
misreporting their status intentionally. In examining the quality of Black businesses started in
recessions I find that that there is no significant difference in average yearly business income
generated by businesses started in booms vs. those started in busts for Blacks. Moreover,
businesses started by Blacks in recessions are not less likely to be incorporated compared
8to those started by Blacks in booms, or compared to those started by Whites in recessions.
Lastly, using a Cox-proportional hazard I show that Black businesses are likely to survive for
as long as White businesses when started in recessions. These findings suggest that Blacks are
not merely mis-reporting their employment status, but are starting legitimate businesses that
perform well. The instrumental variable approach along with exhaustive robustness checks
on business quality and individual ability empirically establish the transient changes in the
entrepreneurship gap.
The second empirical challenge relates to the concerns with establishing non-rigidity of
Black wages. They are four-fold: (1) reverse causality, (2) compositional changes in labor
force affecting the wages of Blacks and Whites differentially, (3) unobservable correlates af-
fecting the outcome variable and (4) wages of low-ability groups are actually proxying for a
decrease in Black wages. To account for the first concern I again use the Bartik instrument
to instrument for unemployment, and find that my results hold with significance but an in-
crease in magnitude. To account for the second concern and to establish that the fall in Black
wages is not the result of higher wage-earning Blacks losing their jobs in higher proportion to
lower wage-earning Blacks, I use individual fixed effects in my estimation, thereby demeaning
right-hand side variables. This also mitigates the third concern as individual fixed effects
also account for time-invariant unobservable correlates of ability such as innate intelligence
or personality. Now, the fourth concern is the argument that low-wage earners see a sharper
drop in their wages during recessions, and since Blacks are more likely to be employed in low-
wage earning jobs my results are picking up a wage-group (or ability) effect and not a racial
effect. To address this concern I divide my sample into high and low wage earners using past
market wages, and examine the response to shocks in the two different populations. Finding
no significant difference in wages between Blacks and Whites among the low-wage earning
group would suggest that Black wage procyclicality is an ability specific phenomenon and not
a race specific one. However, I find that Blacks among both populations earn significantly
lower compared to Whites with increase in unemployment. The finding that Blacks witness
a relatively larger drop in wages across all skill levels is evidence that wage procyclicality is
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specific to Blacks and not particular to low-wage earners.
The third empirical challenge lies in establishing that discrimination explains non-rigidity
of Black wages lies in accounting for the varied characteristics of the 50 US states, and that
of the populations living in them. I use a triple interaction term that allows for differential
impact of cycles on Blacks and Whites at different levels of discrimination. In addition I
include year Fixed effects for White and Black individuals interacted with Region groups.
That is, I control for time-invariant regional characteristics for each race. This allows me to
separately identify variation in wages which is not picked up by any time-invariant factors
common to individuals of the same race across Regions with the same geography but differing
discrimination levels.
To summarize, my paper presents novel findings on transient changes of the entrepreneur-
ship gap during periods of high unemployment. I show that the changes in the entrepreneur-
ship gap is influenced by a widening of the wage gap, and that changes in the wage gap are
explained by discrimination. In Section 2 I describe a simple model to illustrate the mecha-
nism through which individuals transition between wage and self-employment. In Section 3 I
present the data, in Section 4 the methodology and results. Section 5 is a discussion of the
results.
1.2 Illustrative Model
I present a framework illustrating the mechanism through which individuals transition be-
tween the labor and self-employment market. This framework is for illustrative purposes and
gives me a series of testable implications. I show that a change in economic conditions can
affect relative wages which in turn can change the relative payoffs associated with wage em-
ployment, leading an individual to choose self-employment at different times of the economic
cycle. I provide a series of conditions illustrating the above mechanism, that I further test
in the data. The model along with the data establish that business ownership decisions are
not taken in isolation with labor market conditions, and the changes in the latter influence
decisions to start businesses.
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An individual chooses between joining the labor market with a certain outcome of wage ω
or joining self-employment which has an uncertain outcome pi. Under this structure, unem-
ployment is the same as choosing employment with a wage of 0. Although wage employment
can lead to an uncertain outcome in the event of being fired, for the ease of exposition I nor-
malize the probabilities. Therefore, in this model an individual can succeed in self-employment
and get a payoff pi with a probability p or fail and get a payoff of 0 with a probability of (1−p)
or choose wage employment and receive a fixed wage ω.
In this model we take R to denote Race of the individual. Past literature has used un-
employment as a proxy for recessions - periods of high unemployment coincide with contrac-
tionary periods in the economy. So unemployment U is a proxy for local economic conditions
with higher values of U indicating worse economic conditions. a indicates ability and is of
two types, High (H) and Low (L). So R ∈ {W,B}, U ∈ [0, 1] and a ∈ {H,L}. In my
framework payoffs can be from self-employment or from wage. Wage ω depends on local un-
employment U , ability a, and Race R, and is indicated by ω(U, a,R). The literature on wage
gaps has established that ω(U, a,B) < ω(U, a,W ). The self-employment or business payoff is
uncertain, with probability of success p and associated payoff pi. In the data probability of
success p is represented by the length of time that the business is alive, and is calculated by
the difference in the year it ended and the year that it started, with the assumption being
that longer surviving businesses are more successful. I assume that both p depends on the
race, the level of local unemployment and ability. Payoff pi is the business income that is
reported by the individual. For ease of exposition I assume that payoff pi is a function of
the race and ability. The race of an individual determines the ease of access to capital and
financing opportunities, the degree of consumer discrimination faced by the individual and
also the extent of transferred know-how and knowledge that is available to the individual -
all factors that determine whether a business can succeed or not. So probability of success
is given by p(R,U, a). I assume that local unemployment affects the probability of success
and not payoffs as well. Therefore, payoffs are given by pi(R, a). In order for an individual to
prefer self-employment over wage employment expected payoff from Self-Employment has to
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be greater than Expected payoff from Wage Employment. Expected payoff from SE can be
written as EPSE and EPWE is that from wages, where
EPSE = p(R,U, a)pi(R, a), (1.1)
EPWE = ω(R,U, a). (1.2)
So for an individual to choose SE over WE it has to be true that
EPSE > EPWE (1.3)
Or from (1.2)
p(R,U, a)pi(R, a) > ω(R,U, a), or, p(R,U, a)pi(R, a)− ω(R,U, a) > 0 (1.4)
Denoting S as the probability of an individual choosing SE over WE we get, Pr(EPSE − EPWE)R
= SR > 0. Overall in our sample since Whites are more likely than Blacks to start businesses
therefore, SBLACK < SWHITE .
Substituting (1.2)
Pr[p(R,U)pi(a,R)− ω(U, a,R)]W > Pr[p(R,U)pi(a,R)− ω(U, a,R)]B (1.5)
By assumption, p(B,U) < p(W,U) and from empirical data ω(U, a,B) < ω(U, a,W ) and
SBLACK < SWHITE . We can then test whether pi(a,B) < pi(a,W ). Now, when there is
a recession or period of high unemployment, that is, U increases, then there is a change in
the relative payoffs. Empirically it is true that the probability of Black individuals being
self-employed is greater than that of White individuals. Assuming that change in economy
leads to change in probability of being self-employed, and because in a recession Blacks have


















Now, 1.6 can happen if unemployment reduces the expected payoff from self-employment
for Blacks compared to whites, or because wages drop more for Blacks than for Whites, or



















































The equations 1.9 and 1.10 are testable in the data. If 1.9 holds then increasing payoffs
from SE motivates the transition from WE to SE for Blacks. If 1.10 holds then during
recessions, wages fall below a threshold to make SE more attractive over WE. It is important
to distinguish between which if any of the above two conditions hold, since it is not known
how either business profitability or the wage gap changes with business cycles. I find that
wages are pro-cyclical for Blacks but sticky for Whites during high unemployment. Therefore
1.10 holds. I find 1.9 however does not hold as there is no significant difference in business
income during periods of high unemployment for Blacks and Whites.
1.3 Data and Summary Statistics
I use the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (hereafter PSID) database which is a panel survey
on individuals from 1968 to 2003 that gathers information on income, educational background,
wealth, debt, parental history, employment and entrepreneurial history among others. The
PSID database has been previously widely used in the entrepreneurship and labor economics
literature. The PSID survey was not administered in the years 1998 and 2000 and these
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years are therefore dropped from my sample. According to PSID documents a total of 18000
individuals were eventually covered over the 35 years. A new household was spun in the
survey when households split due to divorce or death, and the new household was followed
subsequently. Each year a questionnaire was administered in person or over the phone to
the head of the household. There are 209,000 observations for which business ownership or
employment decisions are documented. Table 1.2 shows that 9.3 percent of the sample are
business owners. This is similar to other estimates from other samples in past literature.
34.6 percent of the sample is Black11 60.7 percent is White while the rest constitute other
minorities. 70 percent of the sample is Male. The average family size is around 3 people with
a standard deviation of 1.7 persons and the average age is 43 years with the ages ranging from
18 to more than 100 years old. The average number of jobs held by a person during their
lifetime is 2.5 with a standard deviation of 2.2.
Tables 1.3 and 1.4 show characteristics of the White and Black samples respectively. The
Black sample, with a mean age of 41 is younger than the White which has a mean age of 45.
The White sample consists of a higher proportion of males (77 percent) compared to the Black
which has 56 percent. The average Black household has 3.2 family members compared to the
average White household which has 2.7. Past work experience does not vary significantly
across the two races: Black employees hold an average of 2.36 jobs in their lifetime, while a
White employee holds 2.52 jobs. However, 63.6 percent of the White sample are homeowners
compared to 34.8 percent among Blacks. 80 percent of the White sample are high school
graduates compared to 67 percent among the Blacks. 12.9 percent of White individuals in
this sample are business owners; compared to only 3.4 percent among Blacks. 29 percent of
the White businesses are incorporated, compared to 16.5 percent of Black businesses. The
average yearly business income as well as the variance in business income for both Black and
White businesses are very similar.
The literature on business cycles uses many different measures to mark recessions or poor
11According to PSID documents, the focus of the study was poverty in 1968 and this resulted in an over-
sampling of Blacks in the PSID. Questions on consumption, savings, expenditure and others can be adjusted
with probability-of-selection weights. The document states the following: In the absence of non response
bias, the PSID’s rules for tracking individuals and families over time lead to accurate representation of the
non-immigrant U.S. population both cross-sectionally each year, and in terms of change, since 1968.
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economic conditions. Popular measures are NBER designated year dummies, unemployment,
and Gross State Product (GSP) or state income. In order to mark recessions or poor economic
times I use two measures. Firstly I use a dummy to mark NBER designated recessions. There
are 10 such recession years in my sample. Secondly I use state yearly unemployment rates
from 1976 to 2003 obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Thus the sample using
unemployment rates is smaller than that using recession dummies from NBER. State income
data has been rejected by authors in the past due to high measurement errors that bias the
coefficient towards zero, (Wolfers 2007) and I do not use this measure for the same reason.
I use the General Social Survey (GSS) data in order to gauge state-level discrimination.
The GSS was administered to individuals in multiple waves starting in 1972 until 2004. There
are more than 30 questions on racial sentiment, although each question was not asked each
year. Some of these questions focus on governmental policy concerning race matters while
others focus purely on racial attitudes. I follow the method adopted by (Charles & Guryan
2007) in constructing the index for racial discrimination. I construct the index using ten
questions that appear jointly in the survey each year; these have been listed in Appendix 1.
The responses used are by Whites who are 18 years and older.
Lastly, for robustness checks and for detailed unemployment data that is not available in
the PSID, I use the March reports of Current Population Survey (CPS) from 1968 to 2003.
While the PSID has basic data on unemployment status, it is only the CPS which allows me
to distinguish voluntary termination of employment from the layoffs or firings. I use this data
to disentangle low-skill wage procyclicality from race-based wage procyclicality.
1.4 Methodology and Results
There are three subsections to this section. The first subsection demonstrates changes in
the racial entrepreneurship gap and accompanying changes in the wage gap during worsening
economic conditions. These findings suggest that individual decisions to start businesses are
influenced by labor market options and when Black wages fall sufficiently Blacks are more
likely to start businesses. In the second subsection I explore a potential cause of procyclicality
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of Black wages discrimination. I look at the variation of the entrepreneurship and wage gaps
with unemployment in states with varying levels of discrimination. In the third subsection I
describe endogeneity concerns and conduct extensive robustness checks to address empirical
challenges.
1.4.1 Entrepreneurship gap and the Wage gap during Business Cycles
Table 1.1 lists the variable definitions used throughout this paper. Column 1 of Table 1.6
shows that in the overall sample Blacks prefer wage employment to self-employment, leading
to the racial gap in business ownership rates. According to Table 1.3 and Table 1.4 the rate of
business ownership among Whites is 13 percent while that among Blacks is 3.4 percent which
is one-third that of the White rate. Figure 1.1 demonstrates the entrepreneurship rates of
Black, White, male and female groups in the panel from the years 1968 to 2003. The mean
ownership rate in the sample is around 9 percent as shown in 1.2. Column 1 of Table 1.6
shows that Blacks are 5.6 percentage points (pp) less likely than Whites to be business owners.
This makes them around 60 percent less likely than Whites to be Business Owners over the
mean rate. I control for variables that can be expected to be correlated to being a business
owner: MALE is a dummy indicating that the individual is male; TOTEMPLYR is the total
number of employers the individual has had till that year; AGEHD is the age in number of
years; FAMSZ is the number of members within the family; FatherSE is a dummy which is set
to 1 when the individual’s father was reported to be self-employed; lnlaggedHrs is the log of
the number of hours that the individual was unemployed the previous year; lnDeflatedWage
is the log of the deflated (using 1984 CPI) wages that the individual was paid the past year.
lnNominalWages is the log of the nominal wages earned that year.
I next examine the likelihood of becoming a business owner during a recession. To desig-
nate an economic recession I use two measures, unemployment and NBER designated dum-
mies. HPSmoothUnemprate is the state-year Hodrick-Prescott filtered unemployment rate
from 1976 to 2003. Contraction is a dummy which is assigned 1 when part or all of that year
was designated as a recession by NBER. As a first step I use OLS to estimate the likelihood of
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being a business owner during poor economic conditions, shown in Equations 1.12 and 1.13.
Here “White business owners” is the omitted category and β2 gives the differential effect of
effect of recessions on likelihood of Blacks to be business owners. Here i designates individual
and t designates the year.
BusOwneri,t = α1 + β1 ∗ Contractiont + β2 ∗ Contractiont ∗BLACKi
+X ‘i ∗ ζ1 + i,t (1.12)
BusOwneri,t = α1 + β1 ∗HPSmoothUnempRates,t
+β2 ∗HPSmoothUnempRates,t ∗BLACKi
+X ‘i ∗ ζ1 + i,t (1.13)
Business owner is a binary variable, and X represents the vector of controls. I control for
all variables that previous literature has shown to influence decisions to start businesses: age,
past work experience, family size, household income, homeownership status, and whether the
individual’s father was self-employed or not. In order to account for racial concentrations
in different industries, I include industry fixed effects. I also include industry fixed effects
interacted with time trends in order to account for differential vulnerabilities of industries to
exogenous shocks. I include individual fixed effects to account for unobservable time-invariant
characteristics such as innate entrepreneurial ability. I use year and state fixed effects to factor
in year or state specific shocks. I also include state-specific linear time trends to account for
statewide linearly time-varying factors.
I find that Blacks are more likely to be business owners when economic conditions worsen
while White individuals show no such response. In Column 2 of Table 1.6 using Unemploy-
ment rate I find that, 1 pp higher unemployment leads to Blacks being 1.4 pp or 17 percent
more likely than Whites to be Business Owners. In Column 3 I add state-specific linear time
trends and the interaction of year and Industry fixed effects. The reason for this is to account
for trends in industries or states that may disproportionately employ Blacks and simultane-
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ously be vulnerable to economic shocks. Column 3 of this table shows that when these trends
are accounted for Blacks are 18 percent more likely than Whites to be Business Owners dur-
ing recessions or higher unemployment. The entrepreneurship gap therefore narrows during
recessions.
Column 3 of the Table 1.6 shows the variation in business income as unemployment in-
creases. There is no significant difference in business income of Blacks with a 1 percent
increase in unemployment.
Figures 1.2, 1.3 and 1.4 show the distribution of nominal wage changes for economies
following an economic contraction. The upper and lower 2 percentiles of the past log wage
distribution have not been shown in this figure. Figure 1.2 shows how the wages of entire
sample responds when the previous year was an NBER designated contraction. Figure 1.4
shows the response of Black wages to a contraction: there is a heavier distribution of Black
individuals whose wages change negatively than positively. The nominal wage distribution of
Whites in Figure 1.3 however, remains centered on 0 indicating wage rigidity.
I use OLS estimation to determine wage responses to increasing unemployment.
Lnwagei,t = α1 + β1 ∗HPSmoothUnempRates,t
+β2 ∗HPSmoothUnempRates,t ∗BLACKi +X ‘i ∗ ζ1 + i,t (1.14)
The sum of the coefficients β2 and β1 gives the impact of unemployment on Blacks while
β1 gives the response of White wages. To allow for the possibility that unemployment across
states may be correlated across years I cluster standard errors at the state-year level. In
order to counter occupation or industry specific effects on wages, I include occupational and
industry fixed effects. I also include individual fixed effects to account for unobservable time-
invariant characteristics such as innate ability and personality. I use Year and State fixed
effects to factor in year or state specific shocks. Following past literature I control for time-
variant observable qualities that are known to be associated with wages: past number of
employers, age and the square of age, family size, whether the individual is a high school
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graduate or not, and the log of the wages earned in the most recent job. Most recent wages is
a proxy for market valuation of individual skill level (Fryer, Pager & Spenkuchm 2011) and
of unobservable cognitive abilities.
Columns 4 and 5 of Table 1.6 shows the response in wages to shocks; the dependent variable
being log of individual wages. The negative value of β2 and the positive but insignificant value
of β1 indicate that White wages are rigid with increasing unemployment, while Black wages
fall. Column 4 shows that nominal Black wages fall by 5.8 percent when unemployment
increases by 1 percent. When state-specific linear time trends and the interaction of industry
and time fixed effects are included this magnitude drops to 5 percent, but remains significant.
A wage drop of this magnitude changes the relative payoff from wage employment vis-a-vis
self-employment, thereby pushing more workers into entrepreneurship.
1.4.2 Discrimination as an explanation for Black wage procyclicality
Theories of discrimination attribute the unexplained portion of the wage gap to discrimina-
tion against Blacks. I hypothesize that discrimination also causes changes in the wage gap
during recessions. Fairness norms have been cited as a reason that wages are rigid following
negative shocks; past literature has speculated that prevailing social mores prevent employers
from reducing White wages12. However, it is not known how minority populations fare under
these fairness norms: do these norms apply to them as well? It is conceivable that in states
characterized by high measures of racial prejudice these social norms do not apply symmetri-
cally to Whites and Blacks and it is actually socially acceptable among some populations to
treat Black employees differently. I hypothesize that discrimination in periods of high unem-
ployment causes employers to lower Black wages, leading to counter-cyclicality of the wage
gap. I use GSS data for the years 1972-2003 to construct an index that captures prevailing
racial attitudes in the 50 states. GSS has 20 questions that relate to race relations that were
asked of 1000 respondents. I use 9 of these questions to construct my discrimination index. I
normalize the value of responses using the 1977 responses. The methodology followed is the
same as (Charles & Guryan 2007). Denoting dki,t as respondent i’s response in year t to the
12(Kahneman, Knetsch & Thaler 1986)
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question k. The normalized response is obtained by subtracting the mean of the responses in
1977 and dividing by the variation in responses in 1972 or the first year that the question was





I then take the mean of the responses Dki,t across k questions for each individual i and
year t. The mean of this by state and year gives the aggregate average value of prejudice for
that state and year. The discrimination score assigned to a state is the mean of the prejudice
scores over the years 1972-2003. I first calculate state-level average discrimination indices and
then delineate the upper and bottom terciles of the discrimination index. I classify states
as high discrimination states when their score falls in the top tercile of the distribution of
discrimination index. Those states whose discrimination score falls in the bottom tercile are
classified as low discrimination states.
Figure 1.7 shows the variation of the discrimination index across the 50 states in the United
States using the Census-Bureau designated classification for regions. By this classification all
US states can be grouped into 9 regions. The US Map shows the variation of discrimination
across these regions - darker green areas have higher average prejudice. The map shows
that the Pacific region comprising of the states Washington, Oregon, Hawaii and California
have the lowest rate of prejudice against Blacks, followed by the New England States of
Massachusetts, Maine, New Hamphshire and Vermont. The East South Central States of
Kentucky, Tennessee, Missouri and Alabama document the highest discrimination followed
by the South Atlantic States of Florida, Georgia, South and North Carolina, Virginia and
West Virginia. Figure 1.7 illustrates how the discrimination index varies across the 9 regions
in the United States.
I hypothesize that the effect of higher unemployment on wages is greater in areas of
higher discrimination. This should mean that the effect of falling wages on business ownership
decisions should also be more pronounced in areas of higher discrimination as well. As a first
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pass I estimate the effect of recessions on wages and business ownership decisions in high
and low discrimination states while controlling for observable characteristics of individuals. I
include state, year, individual and industry fixed effects to account for time-invariant cross-
sectional variation. I also include state-specific linear time trends to account for time varying
state-level characteristics.
Column 1 and 2 of Table 1.8 show that the wage gap is larger in high discrimination
states, and that this gap increases with increasing unemployment. Black wages fall by 8.5
percentage points relative to White wages when unemployment increases by 1 percentage
in high discrimination states while the decrease in wages in the low discrimination states
is smaller in magnitude and not significant. The entrepreneurship gap also changes with
higher unemployment and discrimination index. Blacks are 1.14 pp more likely to be business
owners in high discrimination states as unemployment increases by 1pp. The mean probability
of being a business owner in the entire sample of US states is around 9 percent. So this is a 13
percentage increase over mean probability of being a business owner. In low prejudice states,
this effect is smaller, around 9 percent in magnitude. This suggests that during recessions
falling Black wages and higher Black business ownership rates are associated with levels of
discrimination predominant in the individual’s state.
In the following section I address endogeneity concerns and use an IV approach along with
a variety of robustness checks to support my causal inference.
1.4.3 Endogeneity Concerns and Robustness Checks
1.4.4 Instrumental Variable Estimation of changes in Entrepreneurship and
Wage Gaps
One significant concern with using unemployment to estimate changes in business ownership
rates is that decisions related to voluntary termination of wage employment to start a new
businesses could be affecting local unemployment. Another concern is that there is a third
exogenous variable such as external opportunity that could be differentially affecting both
self-employment decisions by Blacks vs. Whites, as well as local unemployment rates. There
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are analogous concerns associated with using unemployment to estimate change in wages. I
use an IV two stage least squares (2SLS) approach to address these issues on reverse causality
and omitted variable bias.
An appropriate IV for unemployment is one that is correlated with unemployment but
exogenous to self-employment decisions or individual wages. I use the Bartik instrument
(Bartik 1991) to instrument for unemployment as used previously by (Wolfers 2007). The
Bartik instrument is constructed on a state-year basis for 9 sectors as the shock to the national
level oil price interacted with earnings from that sector share in that state and year shown




θI ∗ (SectorEarningsI,s,1940 ∗∆LogPriceOilt−1) (1.16)
The 9 Sectors used in constructing the instrument are agriculture, mining, construc-
tion, manufacturing, transport, wholesale, service, government and military. Sector spe-
cific earnings are obtained from Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). The sector shares are
measured using average share of state earnings in 1940. There are two endogenous vari-
ables: HPSmoothUnempRate which is instrumented with Bartik and the interaction term
HPSmoothUnempRate which is instrumented with the interaction of Bartik and BLACK.
The corresponding first stage equations are:
HPSmoothUnempRates,t = α1 + δ1 ∗ bartiks,t +X ‘i ∗ ζ1 + i,t (1.17)
HPSmoothUnempRates,t ∗BLACKi = α1 + δ2 ∗ bartiks,t ∗BLACKi +X ‘i ∗ ζ1 + i,t
(1.18)
The high F-statistics reported from the Stock and Yogo Weak Instruments test (Stock
& Yogo 2005) in the first stage regressions shown in Columns 1 and 2 of Table 1.7 reveal
this instrument as unlikely to be a weak instrument and to be strongly correlated with state-
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year level unemployment. At the same time it can be reasonably expected to be exogenous
to individual self-employment decisions or individual non-industry specific changes in wages
as sector share earnings interacted with change in oil price is unlikely to have local impact
on these factors. Table 1.7 shows that the results hold as expected with a slight change in
magnitude. Column 1 shows that a 1 pp increase in unemployment causes Black wages to fall
by 8 pp relative to White wages - the IV estimate is larger (8 pp) in magnitude compared to
the OLS estimate (5.3 pp). A one pp increase in unemployment causes a Black person to be
.5 pp more likely than a White person to be a business owner which represents a decrease in
magnitude compared to the OLS estimate (which is 1.1 pp).
1.4.5 Robustness Checks on the Entrepreneurship Gap
Another empirical challenge faced in this paper is to establish that the decrease in the en-
trepreneurship gap is a real decrease and not an artifact of misreporting by unemployed
individuals. Since the Black unemployment rate is twice that of the White rate in recessions
as shown in Figure 1.8, the concern is that a disproportionately greater number of unemployed
Blacks misreport their employment status as self-employed compared to Whites. I address
this concern in three different ways. Firstly, I confine my sample to only business owners and
not all self-employed individuals. So to determine whether a person is a business owner or
not I examine the response to the question ”Do you own a business”. The rationale for doing
so is that individuals are less likely to be misrepresent owning a business, than they would
about being self-employed, which is a definition that can be more broadly interpreted.
Secondly, I examine the ability profiles of those Blacks that move into entrepreneurship
during recessions. If these individuals are misreporting their status as self-employed when
they are really unemployed then they should be of a lower ability than those who remain
employed. I do not find this to be the case. On the contrary, I find that it is the higher
ability Blacks that move into entrepreneurship following a contraction. Figure 1.6 shows
the kernel density distribution of the ability of Blacks that move between the Labor market
to Business Ownership when going from an expansion to an NBER-designated Contraction.
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Here, the log of previous market wages is a proxy for ability. The figure shows that the ability
of Blacks moving from labor to business ownership is higher than those who remain in the
labor market. This finding suggests that those who start businesses in recessions are likely
to be doing so of their own volition on average, and not because they were forced to do so
by increasing unemployment. I find a similar pattern among Whites moving from labor to
business ownership going from an expansion to a contraction in Figure 1.5.
As a third check of the veracity of the employment status I examine the quality of busi-
nesses started in recessions. As a measure of quality I examine three factors: the probability
of being incorporated, the average duration that the business is alive, and the business income
generated. If unemployed individuals mis-report themselves as business owners then we can
expect that these businesses will be less likely to be incorporated, may generate lower income
and will last for shorter duration as the owner is likely to revert back to wage employment as
soon as possible. I do not, however, find evidence of any of the above, much to the contrary
in fact. Column 1 of Table 1.13 shows the difference in likelihood of businesses being incorpo-
rated and yearly business income when started in a contraction year. Here StartContraction
is a dummy which is set to 1 when the business was started in an NBER designated recession
year. Column 1 shows that likelihood of a business started in a contraction by a Black owner
being incorporated is not significantly different from that started at the same time by a White
owner. Nor is there a significant difference in likelihood of incorporation between businesses
started in a contraction or a non-contraction year for Blacks. Column 2 of Table 1.13 shows
difference in the business income generated by Black and White businesses started in con-
tractions vs. expansions. I do not find any significant difference in yearly income reported
by businesses started in contractions vs. expansions or White and Black businesses started
in contractions, further supporting the evidence that Black businesses started in recessions
are not of inferior quality. As the last check of quality I look at duration of business which
is calculated as the number of years the business owner reports himself as owning a business.
In order to deal with survivor bias in my sample I estimate hazard ratios for the length of
duration of these businesses using a Cox-proportional hazard model. Table 1.5 shows that
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on average, businesses survive 3.4 years, with a standard deviation of 5 years. 90 percent of
businesses last fewer than 9 years, and more than half of the businesses survive for less than
3 years. Table 1.14 shows that businesses started in recessions are longer-lived than those
started in booms. On average, businesses started in recessions are likely to last 0.6 years or
8 months longer. There is, however, no significant difference between those started in reces-
sions by Whites or Blacks. If disproportionately more unemployed Blacks relative to Whites
were mis-reporting their employment status then we would expect to see White businesses
started in recessions to be longer-lived than Black-owned businesses, but that is not the case.
These three findings on the quality of businesses suggest that businesses started by Blacks in
contractions or periods of high unemployment are legitimate businesses that are not inferior
quality to those started by Blacks in booms, or Whites in recessions.
1.4.6 Robustness Checks on the Wage Gap
One of the main challenges in this paper is to establish that wages of Blacks are not rigid but
decrease with increasing unemployment. The first concern is that Black wages may appear
to decrease due to a compositional change in the labor force. That is, higher-wage Blacks
are eliminated from the labor pool with increasing unemployment, driving down the average
Black wages. I address this concern in several ways. Firstly I include individual fixed effects in
my estimation; this effectively demeans individual wages and so counters the above argument.
It also accounts for time-invariant unobservable correlates of wages, such as personality and
innate intelligence. Secondly, I control for observable characteristics by including past job
experience, education and past market wages among other correlates13. I find that the wage
gap procyclicality result holds with similar magnitude even when I control for past wages,
shown in Column 5 of Table 1.6 indicating that Black workers do indeed see nominal wages
fall relative to Whites, and wage gap procyclicality is not merely an artifact of a change in
the composition of the employed labor force. Lastly, I look at the sample of workers that are
laid off or fired in recessions. I use the CPS data which makes a distinction between those
13Fryer and co-authors argue that past wages determine market valuation of skills and unobservable non-
cognitive abilities (Fryer, Pager & Spenkuchm 2011)
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workers who were fired or laid off and those who left voluntarily. I divide the sample into
workers who have attended some years of college and those who have not attended any college.
Approximately half of the unemployed sample was fired while the other half was either not
in the labor force, or left voluntarily. Table 1.15 shows that those workers who have attended
college for some time are 2 percentage points less likely to be fired than those who have never
attended college. While this is statistically significant, the economic magnitude is small.
Blacks are more likely to be fired compared to Whites. More educated Blacks, however, are
less likely to be fired compared to less educated Blacks. Therefore, the decrease Black average
wages is not likely to be coming from higher wage Blacks being eliminated from the labor
pool compared to Whites.
The second concern with establishing Black wage procyclicality is that the procyclicality
of Black wages results from procyclicality of low-skill wages, and is not related to race. In
other words, as Blacks are disproportionately employed in low-wage jobs compared to Whites,
and during bad economic times, wages of these jobs are reduced, and not specifically Black
wages. It is therefore required to disentangle the bad economic conditions on ability types
from racial groups. I do this in the following way. I use the logarithm of the previous market
wages as a proxy for ability. I calculate the mean wage for each state, year and occupation. I
then divide the sample into the High Wage Earners, who are those earning greater than the
average wage and Low Wage Earners who are the reverse. If wage procyclicality is an ability
affect rather than a race affect then we expect there to be no difference in year-to-year wage
change following a shock between Blacks and Whites. I do an OLS estimation of year-over
year wage change going into a recession with State, Year and Occupation fixed effects, and
examine whether this change varies for Blacks and Whites. I control for all known correlates
of wages and also for the current unemployment rate. The coefficient on BLACK in Columns
1 and 2 of Table 1.16 shows that for both ability groups, Black wages fall more relative to
White wages when going into a recession. From this we can be fairly confident that wages are
indeed pro-cyclical for Blacks and not for low-wage earners.
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1.4.7 Discrimination as an explanation for the Wage Gap
The third challenge faced in this paper is to establish that discrimination causes wages to
decrease more in high discrimination states compared to low discrimination states. And this
in turn affects the entrepreneurship gap. These results build on the work of Charles and
Guryan ((Charles & Guryan 2007)) who show that the wage gap is larger in states with
higher prejudice. In their estimation the authors take the average gap in wages at the state-
year level to be the dependent variable, while I look at individual wages. This allows greater
precision and lower omitted variable bias as I am able to account for cross-sectional individual
correlates.
However, this estimation is also not without its limitations. While the preliminary evidence
suggests that discrimination exacerbates the role of wages in affecting business ownership de-
cisions, there are endogeneity concerns that could be biasing the estimates . The foremost
concern is related to unobservable correlates of wages and discrimination across states that
are not captured by controls, or time-invariant fixed effects or linearly time-variant state-
specific trends. Individuals of differing characteristics such as ability, leisure preferences and
entrepreneurial spirit may elect to live in different parts of the country, and this could po-
tentially confound estimates. For example within each race ability, leisure-preference and
entrepreneurial spirit of individuals living in the rural Mid-Western states may differ from
those living in the Coastal States - and these differences may not be captured by observable
controls or fixed effects. So the response of wages to shocks is the efficient market response
to differing levels of productivity of the local populations in these very different states. More-
over, these factors would simultaneously affect the magnitude of change in wages and the
propensity to start businesses. They would also affect the degree of competition for resources,
labor, jobs etc and thereby can also influence racial attitudes. Over time these characteristics
of individuals shape the character of the state.
It is therefore important to compare regions or states that share similar characteristics,
not only of individuals but also markets, geographical endowment, environment and policy
preferences. The 50 US States are so widely different from each other that it is challenging
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to come up with a perfect match. In this paper I attempt a first approximation. Instead of
splitting my sample by discrimination indices I use a triple interaction term that allows for
differential impact of unemployment on Blacks and Whites at different levels of discrimination.
LogWagei,t = α1 + β1 ∗HPSmoothUnempRates,t
+β2 ∗HPSmoothUnempRates,t ∗BLACK+
+β3 ∗HPSmoothUnempRates,t ∗BLACK ∗Discrim+X ‘i ∗ ζ1+
+i,t (1.19)
As an additional control I add year fixed effects for White and Black individuals interacted
with region groups. That is, I control for time-invariant regional characteristics for each
race. This allows me to separately identify variation in wages which is not picked up by any
time-invariant factors common to individuals of the same race across regions with the same
geography but differing discrimination levels. In addition I have the usual list of fixed effects
and controls for year, state, individual and industry. The estimation is shown below:
LogWagei,t = α1 + β1 ∗HPSmoothUnempRates,t
+β2 ∗HPSmoothUnempRates,t ∗BLACK+
+β3 ∗HPSmoothUnempRates,t ∗BLACK ∗Discrim+X ‘i ∗ ζ1+
+Y earFE ∗RegionFE ∗BLACK + InteractionTerms+ i,t (1.20)
Adding all controls and fixed effects interacted with Regions, Column 2 of Table 1.9 shows
that log of nominal wages falls 10 percentage points more sharply in higher discriminatory
states during recessions relative to Whites. Column 1 shows that simultaneously, Blacks are
50 percent more likely (over the mean rate) to start businesses. This effect is smaller than the
overall sample. Thus in highly discriminatory states the magnitude of nominal Black wage
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drop is larger than low-discrimination states. This is accompanied by a larger probability
of Blacks becoming business owners. It is notable that the magnitude of both effects is also
larger than that shown in Table 1.6 which looks at the entire United States and does not
account for discrimination.
Table 1.12 presents intriguing results that shed further light on individual employment
choices in highly discriminatory states. I use labor market participation data from CPS to
evaluate differences in labor force participation by Blacks and Whites in high and low dis-
crimination states. DiscrimIndex gives the discrimination index value of that state. HighDisc
is a dummy which is 1 when the average discrimination score falls within the top tercile of
distribution of discrimination scores. Unemp is a dummy which is 1 when the individual is
unemployed, and nilf is a dummy equal to 1 when the individual is not in the labor force. I
have dropped individuals who are home-makers as well as those who are students from my
sample. Individuals are 10 percent likely to not be in the labor force, and 6.3 percent likely
to be unemployed in this sample. Column 1 of the table shows that Blacks are less likely to
be unemployed in high discrimination states. Living in a high discriminatory state decreases
the likelihood of a Black person being unemployed by .8 percent, which is 13.3 percent over
the mean rate. At the same time it increases the likelihood of dropping out of the labor force
by .9 percent (shown in Column 2) which is 11 percent over the mean rate. Column 3 and 4
show results when I use a continuous discrimination score as the right hand side explanatory
variable instead of the tercile score. I find that increasing the discrimination score by two
standard deviations increases the likelihood of a Black individual not being in the labor force
by 1 percent overall, or 10 percent of the mean rate. These results underscore the pervasive
impact of discrimination. My results in this paper thus show that Black individuals facing
higher discrimination see a sharper drop in wages during recessions. They do not, however,
start more ventures of their own. On the contrary - they drop out of the labor force en-
tirely. In the presence of discrimination, Blacks thus face a higher barrier in engaging in any
productive activity in the economy.
As a third and last check of the impact of discrimination I compare the effect of business
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cycles on individual wage and entrepreneurship in Regions and States that have similar char-
acteristics but varying discrimination indices. I compare the Mid-Atlantic and South Atlantic
Regions in Table 1.11. The Mid-Atlantic States are NY, NJ and PA, while the South Atlantic
States are MD, VA, WV, NC, SC, GA and FL. These Regions are neighbors and share a
coastline, and have comparable per capita income (averaged over 1980-2010) and population
compositions. However, the Mid-Atlantic States have the second lowest value of Discrimi-
nation Index suggesting that racial prejudice is low, while the South Atlantic States have
the second highest. Column 3 of Table 1.11 shows that in the Mid-Atlantic States there is
no significant change in wages between Blacks and Whites when there is a 1 pp increase in
Unemployment. However, in the South Atlantic States the decrease is significantly different
between Blacks and Whites, with Black wages falling by 96 percentage points compared to
White wages. Column 1 shows that higher unemployment is not associated with any accom-
panying change in propensity to be entrepreneur in Mid-Atlantic States but in South Atlantic
States Blacks are 2 percentage points (or 25 percentage above mean) more likely to be en-
trepreneurs. The second comparison is between the East North (WI, MI, IL, IN, OH which
are the low discrimination states) and East South States (which is the highest discrimination
Region comprising of KY, TN, MS, AL), as shown in Table 1.10. Here the magnitudes of the
effects do not vary as widely as in the Mid-Atlantic and South Atlantic states, but the pattern
remains. Similar to Table 1.9 I find that the drop in Black wages in the East South Central
states is not accompanied by a rise in business ownership in these states row 3 of Column 4
shows that the magnitude of the effect of recessions on likelihood of being a business owner
is close to zero.
1.5 Discussion
Why have Blacks historically had such a robust predilection towards wage employment over
being self-employed? One likely explanation is that Blacks perceive themselves to be of
lower entrepreneurial ability than Whites and are therefore less inclined to take on the risk
of discarding a certain fixed wage in favor of the uncertain business income. Since it is
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now accepted that peer networks influence an individual’s decision to become entrepreneurs
(Nanda & Sorensen 2010) the lack of a thriving entrepreneurial network among the Black
community reinforces traditional preferences in this context. An intriguing finding in this
paper is that higher ability Blacks are the ones to transition into business ownership when
the economy enters a contraction from an expansion. These businesses also perform as well as
comparable White businesses starting at the same time. This suggests that there is no innate
difference in entrepreneurial skills among high-ability Blacks and Whites, but that Blacks
of all ability profiles have demonstrated a historical preference for wage employment and
only venture into self-employment when strongly incentivized. I also find that among second
generation entrepreneurs, recessions do not affect their likelihood of starting a business. This,
then suggests that the lack of a thriving entrepreneurial network within the Black community
could be a contributing factor to the lack of entrepreneurship.
Ethnographers such as (Frazier 1957) have also suggested that the cause is to be found
in the Black enslaved past. Oppression, disenfranchisement and the experience of slavery
discouraged the formation of trust-based networks among Blacks and the tradition of buying
and selling, thereby pushing them towards paid employment. Therefore the tradition of
preferring wage employment over self-employment started as early emancipation from slavery.
Breaking out of this tradition may not have been as easy as one might be inclined to think
because of peer effects. Moreover, ethnographers such as (Fordham & Ogbu 1986), (Corwin
2001), (Suskind 1994) have posited that blacks impose a penalty on peers who do not conform
to the racial norm and ’act white’. Individuals engaging in behaviors that are stereotypically
associated with Whites such as academic studies, ballet, or proper speech are rejected and
penalized by their peer group. (Fryer, Pager & Spenkuchm 2011) formalizes the phenomenon
of ’acting white’ as acting as a contributor to sustained underachievement among Blacks and
this can also explain the persistence of preference for wage employment over self-employment.
Since productive entrepreneurship has not traditionally been a popular activity among Blacks
penalties imposed by peers may be reinforcing lower rates in entrepreneurship. Understanding
the impact of network and peer effects on Black entrepreneurship rates is a potential direction
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for future research.
Another important consideration is the access and utilization of finance by Blacks that may
be leading to differences in firm start-up rates and growth. (Robb, Fairlie & Robinson 2009)
surveys 5000 firms from 2004-2006 and shows that Blacks have lower levels of startup capital
as well as second-year capital injections compared to Whites. Is access to financing a barrier
for Black entry into entrepreneurship? Does this vary across business cycles? For example, do
training programs for the unemployed have an impact in business creation during recessions?
These are questions that have been unexplored in this paper and can also be addressed in
future work.
1.6 Conclusion
In this paper I establish unknown empirical facts: (a) The entrepreneurship gap narrows
during periods of economic downturns or high unemployment because a Black individual is
15-20 percent more likely to start a business than a White individual during these times.
(b) The decrease of the entrepreneurship gap is accompanied by the widening of the racial
wage gap - higher unemployment causes Black wages to drop by 6pp more than Whites; this
decrease is not due to a compositional change in the labor force, or occupation or industry
specific shocks. And finally (c) discrimination contributes to the widening of the wage gap
during high unemployment periods: Black wages decrease more in states characterized by
highly discriminatory attitudes compared to low discriminatory states while White wages are
rigid everywhere. Comparing business ownership rates across states, however, I do not find
that Blacks in high discriminatory states are more likely to be business owners during periods
of high unemployment. I argue that the reason for this unexpected but unsurprising finding
is that Blacks in high discrimination states are likely to face higher barrier to entry into
entrepreneurship even as they face steeper wage cuts. And this also explains the finding that
Blacks in high discrimination states are more likely to drop out of the labor force compared
to low discrimination states.
Establishing changes in the racial entrepreneurship and wage gaps, and that discrimination
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explains Black wage procyclicality, are challenging empirical exercises due to reverse causality
issues and bias resulting from unobserved heterogeneity. To tackle these challenges I use an
instrumental variable approach, exploit the longitudinal nature of the dataset to control for
time invariant correlates, and also conduct a battery of robustness checks that give a deeper
insight into the links between the self-employment and labor markets.
This paper illustrates how changes in economic conditions can cause individuals to move
between the labor and self-employment sectors. While these facts do not explain why the
racial entrepreneurship gap exists in the first place it shows conditions under which Blacks are
incentivized to enter entrepreneurship. The decision to start businesses cannot be decoupled
from that to work in wage employment. This link should be an important consideration for
policies designed to promote small business creation.
Understanding the impact of network and peer effects on Black entrepreneurship rates
seems to be an important area of future research. Another important question is to explore
whether lack of financing are creating barriers for Black entrepreneurship. Both these topics
can potentially explain the reason for the entrerpreneurship gap, and are therefore important
avenues of future research. The third and important avenue for future research is to examine




1. Do you think there should be laws against marriages between (Blacks/African-Americans)
and whites?
2. Now thinking about ten years ago, that is in 1972, did you then think there should be
laws against marriages between (Blacks) and whites?
3. White people have a right to keep (Blacks/African-Americans) out of their neighbor-
hoods if they want to, and (Blacks/African-Americans) should respect that right.
4. If your party nominated a (Black/African-American) for President, would you vote for
him if he were qualified for the job?
5. Do you think white students and (Black) students should go to the same schools or to
separate schools?
6. How strongly would you object if a member of your family wanted to bring a (Black)
friend home to dinner? Would you object strongly, mildly, or not at all?
7. (Blacks/African-Americans) shouldn’t push themselves where they’re not wanted.
8. During the last few years, has anyone in your family brought a friend who was a
(Black/African-American) home for dinner?
9. Do you think Blacks should have as good a chance as white people to get any kind of
job, or do you think white people should have the first chance at any kind of job?
10. Do (Blacks/African-Americans)/Whites attend the church that you, yourself, attend
most often, or not?
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1.8 Figures and Tables
Figure 1.1: Business Ownership Rates
Notes: The figure plots the probability of being a business owner by gender and race in the sample
between years 1969 to 2003.
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Figure 1.2: Nominal Wage Change of All Individuals
Notes: The figure plots the nominal wage changes of all individuals in the sample as the economy
went from an expansion to a contraction.
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Figure 1.3: Nominal Wage Change of White Individuals
Notes: The figure plots the nominal wage changes of White individuals in the sample as the economy
went from an expansion to a contraction.
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Figure 1.4: Nominal Wage Change of Black Individuals
Notes: The figure plots the nominal wage changes of Black individuals in the sample as the economy
went from an expansion to a contraction.
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Figure 1.5: Kernel Density Estimates of White individuals
Notes: The figure plots the kernel density estimates of log of wages of White individuals becoming
business owners and staying in wage employment when the economy transitions from an expansion to
a contraction. LabToBOEtoC indicates those individuals who transitioned from labor market to
business ownership when the economy went from an expansion to a contraction. LabToLabEtoC
indicates those individuals who remained employed in labor market when the economy went from an
expansion to a contraction.
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Figure 1.6: Kernel Density Estimates of Black individuals
Notes: The figure plots the kernel density estimates of log of wages of Black individuals becoming
business owners and staying in wage employment when the economy transitions from an expansion to
a contraction. LabToBOEtoC indicates those individuals who transitioned from labor market to
business ownership when the economy went from an expansion to a contraction. LabToLabEtoC
indicates those individuals who remained employed in labor market when the economy went from an
expansion to a contraction.
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Figure 1.7: Map of United States showing variation of discrimination by Region
Notes: This figure shows the variation of discrimination across the United States. Darker green
shades indicate more discrimination. The Pacific Region has the lowest measured discrimination
while the East South Central Region has the highest.
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Figure 1.8: Unemployment Rates of ethnic groups in US from 1991 to 2011
Notes: This figure shows the unemployment rate of Whites, Blacks, Hispanics and Asians in the
United States from 1991 to 2011. The Red line indicates unemployment for Asians, Blue for Whites,
Green for Blacks and Yellow for Hispanics.
Table 1.1: List of Variables
lnNominalWages Log Nominal Wages
BusOwner 1 if the individual is a Business Owner
BLACK 1 if individual is Black
HPSmoothUnempRate Hodrick-Prescott filtered State-Yr unemployment rate
HPSmoothUnempRate BLACK HPSmoothUnempRate*BLACK
TOTEMPLYR Total Number of Past Employers
JM BLACK TOTEMPLYR*BLACK
HSGrad 1 if Individual is a high school graduate
HSGrad BLACK HSGrad*BLACK
HDEDUCATION Number of years of education
AGEHD Age of Individual
AGEHD BLACK AGEHD*BLACK
AgeSq Square of Age
AgeSq BLACK AgeSq*BLACK
FAMSZ Number of family members in household
FAMSZ BLACK FAMSZ*BLACK
lnPrevJobWage Log of Previous Hourly Wages
lnPrevJob BLACK lnPrevJob*BLACK
FatherSE 1 if father of individual was self-employed
FatherSE BLACK FatherSE*BLACK
HomeOwner 1 if individual is a home owner
SomeCollege 1 if individual has attended any college
42
Table 1.2: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N
AGEHD 43.21 17.82 190610
MALE 0.701 0.458 190610
BLACK 0.363 0.481 181619
FAMSZ 2.956 1.762 190610
TOTEMPLYR 2.449 2.258 150563
HomeOwner 0.527 0.499 190610
HSGrad 0.754 0.431 133187
HDEDUCATION 11.908 6.49 145865
FatherSE 0.018 0.132 190610
lnNominalWages 2.023 1.514 132093
lnPrevJobWage 1.583 1.241 107018
HRSUNEMP 95.114 318.089 84683
CollegeCompleted 0.977 1.634 93847
BusIncome 564.955 7588.101 195815
BusIncorp 0.276 0.447 14640
BusOwner 0.093 0.291 185745
HPSmoothUnempRate 6.629 1.094 148074
Table 1.3: Summary statistics Of Whites
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N
AGEHD 44.702 17.879 115768
MALE 0.772 0.419 115768
FAMSZ 2.755 1.523 115768
TOTEMPLYR 2.519 2.354 93715
HomeOwner 0.636 0.481 115768
HSGrad 0.805 0.396 86890
HDEDUCATION 12.614 6.022 89662
FatherSE 0.025 0.157 115768
lnNominalWages 2.187 1.568 82318
lnPrevJobWage 1.7 1.178 69379
HRSUNEMP 63.417 242.431 53015
BusIncome 419.87 3416.414 63325
BusIncorp 0.291 0.454 12509
BusOwner 0.129 0.336 112712
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Table 1.4: Summary statistics of Blacks
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N
AGEHD 40.847 15.756 65851
MALE 0.569 0.495 65851
FAMSZ 3.237 2.049 65851
TOTEMPLYR 2.351 2.094 50875
HomeOwner 0.348 0.476 65851
HSGrad 0.671 0.47 40767
HDEDUCATION 10.747 6.963 52247
FatherSE 0.004 0.065 65851
lnNominalWages 1.702 1.336 44374
lnPrevJobWage 1.347 1.327 34532
HRSUNEMP 151.386 415.309 29633
BusIncome 417.069 3362.761 35747
BusIncorp 0.165 0.371 1653
BusOwner 0.032 0.176 64200
Table 1.5: Length of Business estimated by Cox-Proportional Model





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.7: IV Estimation of Entrepreneurship and Wage Gap during Business Cycles
Observations are at individual- year level. Robust Standard errors are clustered at State-Year
level. For Column 2, covariates are number of past employers, age of individual, number of
family members in individual’s household, whether the individual’s father was self-employed
or not, educational level attained, whether the individual owns a home or not, and all of these
interacted with a dummy for race. Column 1 includes all of the above covariates along with
square of age, log of past wages, and their interaction terms with the dummy. *, **, ***
indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
(1) (2)
Dependent Variables lnNominalWages BusOwner
HPSmoothUnempRate -2.315 -0.418*
(1.594) (0.243)







Year FE x x
Individual FE No No
Industry FE x x










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.9: Using Triple Interaction term and Regional Controls for Discrimination Across
States
Observations are at individual- year level. Robust Standard errors are clustered at State-Year
level. BLACK is a dummy set to 1 when the individual is 1. HighDiscrim is a dummy set
to 1 when the individual lives in a state where discrimination exceeds average discrimination.
For Column 1, covariates are number of past employers, age of individual, number of fam-
ily members in individual’s household, whether the individual’s father was self-employed or
not, educational level attained, whether the individual owns a home or not, and all of these
interacted with a dummies BLACK and HighDiscrim. Column 1 includes all of the above
covariates along with square of age, log of past wages, and their interaction terms with the
two dummy variables. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
(1) (2)
Dependent Variable BusOwner lnNominalWages
HPSmoothUnempRate High -0.000707 0.103***
(0.000905) (0.0140)




HPSmoothUnempRate BLACK 0.0187*** -0.0618
(0.00293) (0.0657)




STATE FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
Individual FE Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes




Table 1.10: Wage Gap and Entrepreneurship in East-North and East-South Central Regions
Observations are at individual- year level. Robust Standard errors are clustered at State-
Year level. BLACK is a dummy set to 1 when the individual is 1. Covariates are number
of past employers, age of individual, number of family members in individual’s household,
whether the individual’s father was self-employed or not, educational level attained, whether
the individual owns a home or not, square of age, log of past wages, and all of these interacted
with a dummy BLACK. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable lnNominalWages lnNominalWages BusOwner BusOwner
EN Central ES Central EN Central ES Central
HPSmoothUnempRate -0.597 -2.626 -0.243 1.538***
(3.144) (2.494) (0.578) (0.591)
HPSmoothUnempRate BLACK -0.128** -0.184 0.0159 -0.00506
(0.0588) (0.131) (0.0167) (0.0326)
Observations 2,854 6,079 5,937 11,055
R-squared 0.906 0.914 0.585 0.561
STATE FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occupation Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 1.11: Wage Gap and Entrepreneurship in Mid and South Atlantic States
Observations are at individual- year level. Robust Standard errors are clustered at State-
Year level. BLACK is a dummy set to 1 when the individual is 1. Covariates are number
of past employers, age of individual, number of family members in individual’s household,
whether the individual’s father was self-employed or not, educational level attained, whether
the individual owns a home or not, square of age, log of past wages, and all of these interacted
with a dummy BLACK. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable BusOwner BusOwner lnNominalWages lnNominalWages
Mid-Atlantic South-Atlantic Mid-Atlantic South-Atlantic
HPSmoothUnempRate 0.188 1.231*** -0.143** 0.233*
(0.757) (0.374) (0.0646) (0.128)
HPSmoothUnempRate BLACK -0.0589 0.0227** 0.0175 -0.952**
(0.0548) (0.0101) (0.0673) (0.435)
Observations 8,212 16,533 8,398 4,811
R-squared 0.580 0.591 0.921 0.912
STATE FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occupation Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 1.12: Unemployment and Labor Force Participation by Race and Discrimination
Observations are at individual- year level. Robust Standard errors are clustered at State-
Year level. BLACK is a dummy set to 1 when the individual is 1. HighDisc is a dummy
set to 1 when the individual lives in a state with higher than average level of measured
discrimination. DiscrimIndex is the actual value of discrimination index. Covariates are age
of individual, educational level attained and marital status, and all of these interacted with a
dummy BLACK. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Unemp nilf Unemp nilf
HighDisc Black -0.00742*** 0.0124***
(0.00271) (0.00210)
Black 0.0448*** 0.0561*** 0.0507*** 0.0548***
(0.00359) (0.00384) (0.00376) (0.00400)
Observations 2,561,092 4,308,980 1,856,409 3,201,321
R-squared 0.078 0.592 0.086 0.595
STATE FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual FE No No No No
Occupation Yes Yes Yes Yes
SE Clustering State Year State Year State Year State Year
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.13: Business Incorporation and Business Income during Business Cycles
Observations are at individual- year level. Robust Standard errors are clustered at State-Year
level. BLACK is a dummy set to 1 when the individual is 1. StartContraction is a dummy
set to 1 when the business was started in a recession year. Covariates are number of past
employers, age of individual, square of age of the individual, number of family members in
individual’s household, whether the individual’s father was self-employed or not, educational
level attained, whether the individual owns a home or not, and all of these interacted with a












Year FE Yes Yes
Individual FE No No
Industry FE Yes Yes
SE Clustering Individual Individual
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.14: Cox Proportional Estimation of Duration of Business
Observations are at individual- year level. Robust Standard errors are clustered at State-Year
level. BLACK is a dummy set to 1 when the individual is 1. StartContraction is a dummy
set to 1 when the business was started in a recession year. Covariates are number of past
employers, age of individual, square of age of the individual, number of family members in
individual’s household, whether the individual’s father was self-employed or not, educational
level attained, whether the individual owns a home or not, log wages of previous job held,
and all of these interacted with a dummy BLACK. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%,















Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.16: Wage Change of Blacks and Whites in High and Low Wage Earning groups
Observations are at individual- year level. Robust Standard errors are clustered at State-Year
level. BLACK is a dummy set to 1 when the individual is 1. StartContraction is a dummy
set to 1 when the business was started in a recession year. Covariates are number of past
employers, age of individual, square of age of the individual, number of family members in
individual’s household, whether the individual’s father was self-employed or not, educational
level attained, whether the individual owns a home or not, log wages of previous job held,
and all of these interacted with a dummy BLACK. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%,
5% and 1% level respectively.
(1) (2)









STATE FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
Individual FE No No
Occupation FE Yes Yes
SE Clustering StateYear StateYear
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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IPO pricing and ownership
structure: the Business-Group
effect
Shinjinee Chattopadhyay, Gitit Gershgorn and Aharon Mohliver1
2.1 Introduction
When firms first go public, they tend to experience a surge in share price. Academics have
been documenting this phenomenon, and trying to explain it, since the 1970s ((Ibbotson 1975),
(Reilly 1973), (Ritter & Welch 2002), (Stoll & Curley 1970)). Citing studies produced as early
as 1957, (Stoll & Curley 1970) make these observations on this remarkable price appreciation:
“In the short run, the stocks in the sample showed a remarkable price appreciation. Be-
tween the initial offering date and the first market date, the average 6-month rate of return
for all companies in the sample, over and above the 6-month rate of return on the Standard
and Poor’s Index, was 42.4 percent. On the average, an investor would have done almost 50
percent better per 6-month period by buying new small issues at the offering price [italics in
original] than by investing in a portfolio of larger stocks.”
This phenomenon, commonly referred to in the IPO literature as “first-day return” or
“underpricing”, is both persistent and global. It has been a constant from the very first
studies conducted in the 1950s through the dot.com bubble. In a cross-country comparison,
1This chapter is to be published as a book chapter in the Handbook of Research on IPOs forthcoming edited
by Silvio Vismara and Mario Levis forthcoming in June 2013.
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each and every country studied showed average IPO prices increasing from the offer stage
to market close on the first day of trading. In fact, first-day return is so prevalent that the
authors (Ritter & Welch 2002), in their review paper assert that “We know of no exceptions to
the rule that the IPOs of operating companies are underpriced, on average, in all countries.”
(p. 8). The counterparty in an IPO is the issuing firm. When prices rise on the first day of
trading, this translates into a transfer of (potential) capital from the issuing firm to investors
in the IPO. The literature commonly refers to this as “money left on the table”. The rationale
behind “leaving money on the table” varies according to the theoretical lens used. Signaling
theories suggest that good firms signal their quality by willingly leaving money on the table for
investors ((Welch 1989)). One strand of the literature suggests that firms undertake a “book-
building” exercise to gauge investor interest before they issue an offer price, and underpricing
is merely compensation to investors for revealing private information on their preferences
((Benveniste & Spindt 1989),(Benveniste & Wilhelm 1990)). Another relates to preferential
share allocation: underwriters allocate shares to favored business partners as a quid pro
quo to strengthen the relationship and in expectation of repeated interaction. ((Cornelli &
Goldreich 2001), (Ljungqvist & Jr 2002)).
In this chapter, we argue that the ownership structure of an economy, particularly domi-
nant business groups, is a key source of heterogeneity of IPO underpricing between economies
and can help shed light on some of the debates within the IPO pricing literature. We incor-
porate the concept of dominant groups’ market power by allowing for heterogeneity in the
corporate ownership structure of the economy where the IPO is issued. Based on empirical
facts, we suggest that the ownership structure of an economy should be incorporated into
existing theories on IPO underpricing. We make two main observations. Firstly, we show
that over and above predictors such as market size, legal origin and corruption, the extent of
underpricing and the resulting amount of money left on the table is smaller when the econ-
omy comprises fewer family-owned business groups. If the number of family-owned groups
increases by 1, underpricing decreases by .61 percentage points. Secondly, we show that as
the average number of pyramidal layers within business groups increases, the average under-
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pricing decreases. If the average number of pyramidal layers increases by 1, average IPO
underpricing decreases by 28.3 percentage points. Both the number of family-owned groups
and the number of pyramidal layers are proxies of the distribution of power, competition
and control within an economy. Past literature suggests that as a family-owned group gains
additional layers, it separates ownership from control by diluting ownership with non-family
shareholders. This is explained as an indication both of optimizing ownership structure for
rent extraction ((Almeida & Wolfenzon 2006a)) and of the increased ability to “tunnel” funds
from one group firm to another ((Bae, Kang & Kim 2002);(Bertrand et al. 2008), (Jiang, Lee
& Yue 2010); (Johnson et al. 2000)).
We find that when economic power becomes concentrated in the hands of fewer agents,
the average level of IPO underpricing decreases, leaving less money on the table for partici-
pating institutional investors. We conjecture that this indicates the greater influence of the
business group on institutional investors who depend on the group for business unrelated to
the IPO (such as pension-fund management, insurance and loans). Similar types of agency
behavior have been documented among U.S. mutual funds voting at shareholders’ meetings
for companies whose 401(k) portfolios they manage ((Davis & Kim 2007)).
We also view our findings as supporting existing theories on asymmetric information. Past
literature suggests that one reason for underpricing is that high-quality firms “signal” their
quality by leaving money on the table. As the number of groups in an economy increases,
intensifying competition makes it more important to send such signals, and underpricing
increases. In a more general sense, the more pyramidal business groups there are in an
economy, the more costly it is to assert each groups true quality and since there is a clear group
component to a single firm’s performance ((Bertrand et al. 2008), (Chang & Hong 2000)),
this should be reflected in the pricing of the IPO. The second theory that may speak to
such evidence is that on book-building: as the number of groups increases, competition for
investors also increases, and therefore investors are compensated more for revealing private
information.
We next examine how IPO underpricing varies with the average number of pyramidal layers
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in the economy, which we consider as a proxy for the degree of separation between ownership
and control ((Claessens, Djankov & Lang 2000), (Morck, Wolfenzon & Yeung 2005)). We
control for the market size of the economy and anti-director measure, following past litera-
ture. Corruption is also likely to affect underpricing, and is therefore included as a control.
We also control for legal origin, since it has been found to be strongly correlated with the
strength of small investors and the institutions protecting them. Theories on agency conflict
and asymmetric information predict lower underpricing when there is a greater separation
between ownership and control. Previously, authors have theorized that when groups have
more pyramidal layers, firms are more likely to divert cash in order to benefit the owners of
the groups. ((Almeida & Wolfenzon 2006b)). We find support for this theory. When there
are more pyramidal layers, more funds are diverted into the firm and less money is left on the
table. The chapter is organized as follows. We begin with a review of the literature on busi-
ness groups, their financing constraints and how they function. We then move on to discuss
the IPO underpricing phenomenon, why it happens and the various agency conflicts that are
associated with it. Finally, we present the data and results, a discussion and our conclusion.
2.2 Business groups around the world, internal dealings and
financing constraints
With few exceptions , corporate ownership around the world follows one of two archetypal
structures: the Anglo-Saxon diverse-ownership structure, which is common in the English-
speaking world (predominantly in the United States and the United Kingdom), and the
business-group structure that prevails in other economies around the world. In business-group
economies, large portions of public and private corporations are held by a small number of in-
dividuals or families. This ownership structure was first observed by (Leff 1978) with regards
to the ownership structure in South America, but was not explored extensively by academics
until the publication of two seminal papers by La Porta et al in the late 1990s that observed
both the prevalence of this structure and its dependence on the distantly determined legal
origins of the country (La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes & Shleifer 1999); (La Porta et al. 1998).
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Subsequently, researchers began to map individual economies, and established that business
groups are dominant and common in both developing and most developed economies ((Barca
& Becht 2001), (Claessens, Djankov & Lang 2000), (Faccio & Lang 2002), (La Porta, Lopez-
De-Silanes & Shleifer 1999), (Sacristan-Navarro et al. 2007)).
Several explanations have been put forward to account for this discrepancy in ownership
structure. The foremost theory focuses on inefficient institutions being substituted early in the
countries’ development, followed by a political and economic entrenchment that precludes a
shift toward diversified ownership structure. Emerging economies are often characterized by
poorly developed institutions or financial intermediaries alongside well-functioning product
and labor markets. This lack of developed institutions increases the cost of establishing
contractual relationships and acquiring capital (Khanna & Yafeh 2007). Large business groups
can mitigate some of these problems by allocating capital more efficiently within the group
rather than entrusting it to underdeveloped external institutions ((Chang & Hong 2000),
(Khanna & Yafeh 2007), (Khanna & Rivkin 2001)).
Business groups compete with each other in various markets: goods, labor, access to
government benefits and contracts and in financing their activities. In some of these markets,
they often control mechanisms through which they can obtain preferential access. When
financing their activitiese, for example, groups often influence banks, insurance companies
and asset-managing firms. (Khanna & Palepu 1999) find that in India, firms affiliated with
business groups have better access to international sources of capital than non-affiliated firms.
Weaker regulation also helps groups gain preferential access to capital (La Porta et al. 1998).
The literature finds much evidence of internal business within groups. (Shin & Park 1999),
for example, find that investments made by firms within a business group are less sensitive to
their own cash flow (compared to non-group affiliated firms) but are highly sensitive to the
cash flow of other firms in the group. They interpret this finding as pointing to an internal
capital market within the groups, in which funds flow between firms that are unrelated except
for their membership of the group. In a similar vein, } show that various forms of internal
business exist within Korean groups, including debt guarantees, internal trade and equity
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investments. (Gopalan & Seru 2007) find that intra-group loans are common among Indian
business groups, with lending usually flowing from stronger firms to weaker ones in the same
group. Such loans come with zero-interest terms, and are most common when firms are hit by
negative earnings shocks. The authors also find that such loans reduce the probability of future
bankruptcy of firms. These and other related papers suggest that firms in business groups
are not unrelated, but rather assist each other in ways that are not observed in diversified-
ownership economies.
It is important to note that while intragroup capital markets create better financing
possibilities for affiliated firms, they can reduce the efficiency of capital allocation in the
wider economy even when they are efficient in allocating funds within the group (Almeida &
Wolfenzon 2006a). Critically, Almeida and Wolfenzon show that a group’s choice of a pyra-
midal structure (as opposed to dual-class shares, which offer the same equity control) can be
explained theoretically as an attempt to maximize the ultimate owner’s potential extraction
of cash-flow gains. Divergence of cash-flow rights from control rights has also been tied to
agency problems at the firm level for firms controlled by a group, where the controlling share-
holder’s interests diverge from those of minority shareholders as the cash-flow rights of the
major shareholder diminish ((Morck, Wolfenzon & Yeung 2005)).
Intragroup dealings such as capital allocation, debt guarantee and internal trade can work
to the benefit of the group or to the benefit of the group owner, by diverting funds from firms
in which they have only modest cash-flow rights to others in which their cash-flow rights are
larger. This phenomenon is known as “tunneling” a term first used by (Johnson et al. 2000).
There is mounting evidence that business groups around the world make use of tunneling.
(Bae, Kang & Kim 2002) show that while minority holders of Korean business groups tend
to lose out during a merger or acquisition, the controlling shareholders of the group benefit
through value added to other firms within the group. (Bertrand, Mehta & Mullainathan
2002) find that in a sample of Indian business groups, more than 25 percent of the marginal
rupee value of profits in low-cash-flow firms are ferreted away through tunneling. (Bertrand
et al. 2008) study Thai business groups and find that the sons of business founders exert
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great control over their businesses, especially after the founder dies. They also find that such
control is associated with lower firm-level performance. They hypothesize that there is an
inter-generational dilution of control and ownership, leading to a “race to the bottom” in
tunneling resources out of group firms.
The key question about tunneling is why it exists in the first place. Why do minority
shareholders continue to buy into firms offering low cash-flow rights, despite the evidence
that tunneling takes place? Bertrand et al (2002) propose a few explanations. They suggest
that these firms may provide other benefits that offset investors’ losses from tunneling, such
as political contacts that are especially valuable in emerging economies. A second explanation
is that shareholders are not ex ante informed which firms offer high or low cash flow. The
third is that efficient markets ultimately absorb the effects of tunneling through the growth
of firms following acquisitions. These explanations all apply not only to tunneling funds from
lower cash-flow firms to those higher up in the pyramid, but also to tunneling funds from
institutional investors, both inside and outside the group, to firms that are publicly traded.
(Morck, Stangeland & Yeung 1998) argue that when business groups form a significant
percentage of operational firms within an economy, the poor corporate governance and agency
conflicts within firms impede overall economic growth. In a different paper, (Morck, Wolfenzon
& Yeung 2005) suggest that family businesses and groups invest more in political lobbying
than in innovation or creative destruction, which also contributes to economic stagnation.
It is becoming increasingly clear that business groups use their unique structures of owner-
ship and control to facilitate better access to funds for their member firms and to increase the
wealth of the individuals who control them. This complex relationship between firms within
a group, and between the group and its environment, can manifest itself in the actions taken
by investors considering trades offered by business-group firms.
We postulate that groups’ use of intragroup capital markets, bank loans and trade to
finance their activities, combined with agency conflicts affecting asset managers’ investment
decisions, leads to heterogeneous compensation for IPO investors. Agency-driven behavior
in fund management is a well-documented phenomenon. Davis and Kim showed that even
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in highly regulated and transparent markets such as the U.S., there is a positive association
between business ties and the propensity of mutual funds to vote with management (Davis &
Kim 2007). This behavior is prominent until votes are mandatorily published, at which point
it disappears. Analysts issue a disproportionally high number of “buy” recommendations for
IPOs underwritten by their firm ((Michaely & Womack 1999), and are slower to downgrade
their recommendations than unaffiliated analysts (O’Brien, McNichols & Hsiou-Wei 2005),
Affiliated analysts issue more optimistic growth forecasts ((Dechow, Hutton & Sloan 2000)).
Interestingly, (Bradshaw, Richardson & Sloan 2006)demonstrate that over-optimism is pos-
itively related to net corporate financing activities. In business-group economies, IPOs for
individual firms affiliated with groups are rarely independent of other firms in the group.
Agent-based behavior that benefits the group can therefore show up as increased participa-
tion in IPOs from firms in the same group, as compared with non-group related IPOs. This
enables the group to infuse the firm with investor capital while also maintaining control over
future proxy voting. The group’s asset managers maintain a consistent strategy of heightened
participation, which results in higher pricing for all the group’s IPOs.
2.3 Underpricing: theories and existing evidence
(Stoll & Curley 1970), (Reilly 1973) and (Ibbotson 1975) were among the first to show evidence
on IPO underpricing. On average, IPOs are more likely to be underpriced than not. (Ritter
& Welch 2002) find that, in the US market, the average first-day return or underpricing is
18.8 percent. The comparable daily market return is an average of 0.05 percent, so market
misevaluation is unlikely to explain this large number. Several explanations for underpricing
have been put forth in past literature.
A number of papers theorize or document evidence based on asymmetric information.
They argue that when the issuer is better informed about the quality of the firm than in-
vestors, underpricing functions as a mechanism for signaling this quality to the market. The
implication is that only high-quality firms would agree to leave money on the table. Later, the
issuer can recover the cost via additional issues (Welch 1989)), market response to future div-
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idend announcements ((Allen & Faulhaber 1989)) or analyst coverage ((Chemmanur 1993)).
According to (Amihud, Hauser & Kirsh 2003), another reason for underpricing IPOs is
to use the resulting oversubscription as a signal of investor interest. The authors find that
IPOs tend to be either heavily oversubscribed or undersubscribed, depending on how investors
judge the sentiment of other investors. Overpricing means that some investors are priced out,
which signals lack of interest to other investors. Underpricing makes undersubscription less
likely, and is a preferred strategy for a “noisy” environment where investors’ decisions are not
mutually independent and information on subscription is available.
However, there is also some evidence against signaling theories. (Jegadeesh, Weinstein &
Welch 1993) find that neither underpricing nor post-first day returns tend to lead to future
issuing activity. (Michaely & Womack 1999) find no evidence of higher dividends following
greater underpricing; nor do they find that firms with greater underpricing are more likely to
return to the market for a second offering. Although popular, signaling theories appear to fall
short in some instances. An important theme in the literature on IPO underpricing relates to
conflict of interest, and particularly the role of “book-building”. (Benveniste & Spindt 1989),
(Benveniste & Wilhelm 1990) and (Spatt & Srivastava 1991) argue that the practice of “book-
building” allows underwriters to obtain information from informed investors. First, they set
a preliminary price range for the offer, before going on a “roadshow” with issuers to market
the company to potential investors. The underwriters record indications of interest and use
them to gauge demand for the share, revising the offer price upwards if demand is strong.
However, since investors know that expressing interest results in a higher offer price, they
must be offered incentives in return for revealing how much they are willing to pay; IPO
share allocations and underpricing are among such incentives. (Hanley 2010) was the first
to document the mechanism of book-building empirically, by showing that the degree of
underpricing is positively related to the percentage revision in offer price from the original
offer price. (Ritter & Welch 2002) show that in the period from 1980 to 2001, the average
underpricing was 53 percent in those cases when the offer price exceeded the upper limit of
the price range originally filed. This is significantly above the 12 percent for IPOs priced
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within their filing range, or the 3 percent for IPOs that adjust their offer price downward.
On a related theme, news publications have speculated that underwriters deliberately
leave money on the table and also allocate shares preferentially to investors of their choice.
Since underpricing creates an excess demand for shares, issuers and underwriters can pick
and choose who to allocate shares to. In the academic literature, (Sherman & Titman 2000)
have argued that share allocation is a one of the methods by which investors are compensated
for revealing costly information during the “book-building” process. (Loughran, Ritter &
Rydqvist 1994) suggest that underwriters do not always distribute shares equitably, but allo-
cate them preferentially to their favored buy-side clients when they are in a position to do so.
But if firms know this, why are they still content to leave money on the table? The authors
use prospect theory ((Kahneman & Tversky 1979)) to argue that firms will be more tolerant
of underpricing if they know that their post-market valuation will be higher than expected.
The larger a post-market revision they anticipate, the less likely they are to negotiate with
underwriters on the offer price. (Ritter & Welch 2002) report that 66 billion USD was left on
the table during the Internet bubble, and that IPO allocation shares accounted for as much as
10 percent of shares traded during this period. While there is no clear evidence on how shares
are allocated among the various parties, there is some evidence on how institutional investors,
who are better informed clients, benefit from share allocation. (Hanley 2010) showed that
they benefit significantly from the short-run benefits of IPO underpricing but at the cost of
participating in less attractive offerings. (Aggarwal, Prabhala & Puri 2002) look at US offer-
ings between 1997 and 1998 and report similar findings, while (Cornelli & Goldreich 2001)
look at UK offerings and also reach the same conclusion.
Since institutional investors are also potential block-holders with voting rights, share allo-
cation during IPOs gives them the power to influence the long-term performance of the firm.
For example, (Brennan & Franks 1997) look at a sample of 69 British firms and find that
when shares are distributed more widely among minority holders, the founder is less likely to
be ousted from the firm. (Stoughton & Zechner 1999) suggest that the promised benefit of
underpricing not only attracts large institutional investors, but also incentivizes them to take
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control of management and monitor the firm’s activities more closely. (Mello & Parsons 1999)
develop a model to show that rather than allocating all shares to institutional investors, it is
optimal for a firm to issue dispersed holdings to small and passive investors, before marketing
the controlling blocks to larger and more active shareholders.
We propose a similar argument. Preferential business partners acting as institutional
investors compensate the group through higher IPO pricing, in the hope of receiving future
business from companies affiliated with the group. When these investors are under the group’s
control, the business-group literature suggests this may cause conflicts of interest that will be
reflected in a similar price pattern. The stronger the control exerted by business groups over
the economy, the less is the money left on the table through IPOs.
2.4 Data
We use data on average underpricing spanning 35 countries gathered by (Loughran, Ritter
& Rydqvist 1994) from various papers independently documenting underpricing around the
world. We only use countries for which we could find ownership data, namely Argentina,
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, , Malaysia, Mexico, the
Netherlands, Norway, the Philippines , Portugal, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden,
Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. We
could not find either detailed ownership mapping, anti-director rights or corruption measures
for Bulgaria, China, Cyprus, Egypt, South Korea, Singapore, Poland, Jordan, Nigeria, Russia,
or Saudi Arabia, and therefore excluded those countries from the analysis.
Our data covers samples that range between 20 IPOs (Argentina) and 12,246 IPOs (United
States). The mean underpricing for the countries in the sample is 23.86 percent, with a
minimum of 4.4 percent and a maximum of 88.5 percent. We match this data to corporate
ownership characteristics in these economies based largely on mapping done by (Masulis,
Pham & Zein 2011). In their study, the authors used data on 28,635 firms in 45 countries to
construct a comprehensive map of ownership structures. They found that of the 28,635 firms,
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3,007 were controlled by business groups (using a holdings threshold of at least 20% of voting
rights, or 10% if the owners held additional control mechanisms such as CEO or Chairman
positions). They report two variables that are central to our analysis: average pyramid layer
depth, defined as the average number of pyramid layers across all firms in the economy, and
the number of family groups, defined as the number of family-controlled business groups in
the economy. The average number of pyramidal business groups in the sample is 16.5, ranging
from one group (Austria) to 61 groups (South Korea). The average pyramid layer depth is
0.23, with a minimum layer depth of 0.029 (Switzerland) and a maximum of 0.89 (Israel).
Together, these two variables allow us to proxy the extent to which groups have the incentive
and power to influence the allocation and pricing of their IPOs.
We can also proxy the information cost relating to each group (which we postulate in-
creases as the number of business groups increase). On average, the more layers a pyramidal
group has, the greater the separation between ownership and control, and the more prevalent
conflicts of interest are. The more business groups there are in an economy, the less power
each individual group has vis-a-vis institutional investors and underwriters, both directly
(through the control of financial intermediaries) and indirectly (through the ability to restrict
or enhance future business with external intermediaries).
The functioning of capital markets is highly influenced by the quality of institutions that
regulate trades, the strength and origin of legal institutions and the level of corruption in the
economy.
We estimate an OLS regression, predicting IPO underpricing by the structure of corporate
ownership (average depth of pyramid layers and number of pyramidal business groups), market
size, legal origin and anti-director rights. We introduce corruption, economic risk and legal
risk in different models to avoid multicollinearity. The results are reported in table 1.
Anti-director rights have no significant effect on the pricing of the IPO, while the legal
origin of the country is significant for the countries with French legal origin (Argentina,
Belgium, Brazil, Chile, France, Greece, Indonesia, Italy, Mexico, the Netherlands, Philippines,
Portugal, Spain and Turkey).
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Corruption is positively related to underpricing, suggesting that when economies are per-
ceived as more corrupt, the average price discount sought by investors is higher. Economic
and legal risks also increase the average underpricing. We can attribute the difference in mag-
nitude to the different methodologies and scales used by the institutions collecting the data.
The range of the economic and legal risk scales is 1 to 5, with a standard deviation of 0.74
and 0.64 respectively. This implies that two standard deviations out, IPOs are discounted by
20 percent in economies where the economic risk is high a significant discount in a sample
where underpricing is centered at 23 percent with a standard deviation of 18 percent.
The number of business groups is positively related to the amount of money that is left on
the table for investors, increasing by an average of 0.6 percentage points for each additional
business group. The variance on the number of pyramidal family groups is large, ranging from
1 to 61 with a mean of 16.5. This implies that two standard deviations out in the number of
pyramidal business groups increases the average underpricing by 15 percent.
The average pyramid layer is marginally significant, but interestingly loses significance
when we introduce the variable capturing the countries’ level of legal risk. Since much of the
gains to tunneling are contingent on weak enforcement of contracts and weak legal protection,
the loss of significance when legal risk is modeled suggests that tunneling may be a factor in
IPOs being less underpriced in these economies. The average pyramid layer is 0.229 and the
variable ranges from 0.029 to 0.89 in our sample with a variance of 0.175. This implies that
two standard deviations out on the group pyramid layer, the average underpricing drops by
9.9 percent.
2.5 Discussion
This chapter examines the way ownership structure of firms affect average IPO underpricing,
potential agency conflicts and information effects within an economy. In many countries, mar-
kets are dominated by family-owned business groups rather than smaller independent firms,
and both agency conflicts and information friction manifest differently within these economies.
In previous literature, IPO underpricing has been posited as a reward for investors for sharing
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private information, a signal to investors of the firm’s quality or a way to increase demand
among investors. These explanations are supported by our findings in the previously unex-
plored context of ownership heterogeneity. We find that greater underpricing is associated
with lower numbers of pyramidal layers within business groups in the economy. We postulate
that lower underpricing may indicate more tunneling: business groups with more pyramidal
layers are more likely to divert funds within the group, as has been shown in previous re-
search. In the context of IPO pricing, this would imply leaving less money on the table for
participating investors when firms go public. A second possible explanation for this finding
is that factors endogenous to the group-ownership model change the information gathering
characteristics investors provide during the IPO. A third possible explanation is that inherent
advantages of group ownership are reflected in the risk characteristics of the IPO, providing
more stable but lower underpricing across group firms, we mention a few such advantages in
this chapter.
There is the evidence of co-insurance within firms belonging to the same group, or between
layers of the same group. Since there is evidence that intragroup loans at low interest rates
are prevalent among business groups, there may be less reason to leave money for investors.
A second argument we present is based on reputation. Large pyramidal business groups
with more layers separating ownership from control are often well known, with established
reputations within the economy. This would also lead them to leave less money on the table,
because they have less need to signal their quality to the market than independent firms.
The same holds for building demand during an IPO: membership of a business group with a
large number of pyramidal layers may signal high quality in itself, therefore generating greater
demand for shares and reducing the need to compensate investors and to underprice the IPO.
It is important to understand that there are potential welfare consequences of funds being
diverted. Lower IPO underpricing can reduce the returns to being a non-family shareholder,
thereby affecting economic growth and development. It can also reduce transparency in terms
of the firm’s financial health or accounting practices, which can lead to potentially harmful
consequences.
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Higher underpricing is also associated with a larger number of business groups within
an economy. We postulate that competition drives this finding; the larger the number of
groups, the greater the competition for investor funds and share purchases during an IPO.
Therefore, the need to signal quality increases as competition increases. Our third finding is
that underpricing increases as endemic corruption increases, which suggest interesting future
avenues of inquiry. Do more corrupt countries have a higher concentration of groups with more
pyramidal layers? Is corruption a proxy for the prevalence of tunneling, and lower returns for
shareholders? Or, more generally, do investors demand a higher premium at IPO because the
future benefits or costs of economic corruption are not yet revealed? IPO pricing is a vast
literature, encompassing multiple time periods, industries, countries and firms, but the theme
of heterogeneity in ownership structure remains relatively underexplored. We believe that it
holds the key to resolving many of the unanswered questions and competing theories in the
field.
2.6 Conclusion
This chapter demonstrates links between firm ownership structure and the average IPO un-
derpricing in an economy. We aim to exhibit new avenues of exploring the effects of market
competition, information asymmetry, power and conflicts of interest on IPO pricing. Using a
cross-country analysis based on two independent datasets, we show that the amount of money
“left on the table” for investors decreases with the degree of concentration of ownership within
the economy. We also show that the greater the degree of separation between power and equity
ownership, the smaller the average IPO underpricing. We view these findings as providing
support for IPO pricing theories based on share allocation, social control and power.
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2.7 Tables and Figures
Figure 2.1: Marginal effect of corruption on underpricing (model 2)
Notes: The figure shows the variation of corruption with underpricing. The y-axis plots the average
underpricing while the x-axis plots the corruption index.
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Figure 2.2: Marginal effect of Economic Risk on underpricing (model 3)
Notes: The figure shows the variation of economic risk with underpricing. The y-axis plots the
average underpricing while the x-axis plots the economic risk.
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Figure 2.3: Marginal effect of legal risk on underpricing (model 4)
Notes: The figure shows the variation of legal risk with underpricing. The y-axis plots the average
underpricing while the x-axis plots the legal risk.
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Figure 2.4: Marginal effect of number of pyramidal family groups on underpricing (model 2)
Notes: The figure shows the variation of number of pyramidal family groups with underpricing. The
y-axis plots the average underpricing while the x-axis plots the number of pyramidal groups.
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Figure 2.5: Marginal effect of average pyramid layer on underpricing (model 2)
Notes: The figure shows the variation of number of pyramidal layers with underpricing. The y-axis







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.2: OLS Regression of First day return
Observations are at country level. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level
respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent First day return First day return First day return First day return
average pyramid layer -0.283* -0.305* -0.189
(0.157) (0.164) (0.149)
no ofpyramidal family groups 0.00614** 0.00606* 0.00574*
(0.00296) (0.00310) (0.00292)
mktw -1.03e-08 -2.30e-08* -2.04e-08 -1.86e-08
(1.24e-08) (1.18e-08) (1.24e-08) (1.19e-08)
llsvantidirector 0.00295 0.000467 -0.00525 0.00405
(0.0288) (0.0232) (0.0237) (0.0228)
Legal origin=French -0.143* -0.181** -0.114 -0.159**
(0.0836) (0.0719) (0.0694) (0.0678)
Legal origin=German -0.0345 -0.0447 -0.0464 -0.0238
(0.106) (0.0916) (0.0938) (0.0906)
Legal origin=Scandinavian -0.168 -0.0327 -0.0480 -0.0344







Adj. R-Square 0.0034 0.369 0.340 0.397
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